




















socialist	 collectivization	bore	 continuity	with	pre‐socialist	 agrarian	modernization,	
and	were	instrumental	to	the	transition	to	capitalism.	In	The	Value	of	Labor,	she	
follows	 expert	 and	 policy	 debates	 in	 1930s	work	 science,	 and	 points	 out	 their	
continuities	with	the	institutionalization	of	the	work	unit	in	the	Stalinist	phase	of	
collectivization.	 Such	 continuities	 contradict	 the	 Cold	 War	 concept	 of	 Stalinist	
modernization	as	Soviet	models	imposed	from	scratch.	Targeting	debates	in	the	




its	 commodification;	2)	performativity	of	 economics	 should	also	be	understood	
through	the	history	of	the	material	infrastructures	of	scientific	intervention;	and	
3)	the	Cold	War	periodization	that	separates	socialist	and	capitalist	modernization	
does	 not	 stand	 in	 face	 of	 the	 historical	 continuity	 between	 pre‐socialist	 and	
socialist	infrastructures	of	labour	commodification.	
While	 Lampland’s	 conclusions	 primarily	 address	 debates	 within	 the	















1974).	 In	 the	 context	 of	 that	 socio‐historical	 process,	 the	 commodification	 of	
agricultural	labour	in	Hungary	that	Lampland	traces	can	be	seen	as	part	of	a	long‐
term	 social	 transformation	 structured	 by	 penetrating	 global	 forces	 of	 capitalist	
development.	The	social	positions	of	 the	actors	whose	debates	Lampland	analyses	
can	 be	 identified	within	 that	 larger	 process.	 Lampland’s	 remarks	 on	 structural	
continuities	between	the	interwar	period	and	Stalinism,	as	well	as	her	descriptions	of	





















economies	 and	 the	middle	 segments	 of	 the	 land‐holder	 nobility.	 The	 latter’s	
estates	 were	 not	 large	 enough	 to	 compete	 in	 the	 world	 market,	 they	 were	














serfdom	 and	 the	 commercialization	 of	 manorial	 lands	 to	 improve	 financial	







the	world	market.	 It	was	 their	 interest	 to	create	a	 labour	market	based	 less	on	





On	 the	other	hand,	Széchenyi	 firmly	opposed	 land	reform.	 If	manorial	 land	had	
been	distributed	amongst	the	agrarian	workforce	simultaneously	with	the	abolition	
of	 serfdom,	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	 wage	 form	 would	 have	 been	 impeded,	 as	








process,	 enormous	 estates	 and	 middle‐sized	 farms	 coexisted	 in	 the	 rural	
agricultural	 landscape	 in	the	 interwar	period.	Landless	villagers	were	hired	not	
only	 by	 landlords,	 but	 also	 by	 land‐bearing	 peasants.	 In	 the	 interwar	 period,	
Hungarian	narodnik	intellectuals	heroized	land‐bearing	peasants	in	their	political	
agenda	 for	 land	 reform.	 Their	 social	 status	 was	 universalized	 in	 an	 ideal	 of	 a	
Hungarian	 third	 way	 agrarian	 development	 (neither	 capitalist,	 nor	 socialist),	
which	 they	 sometimes	 referred	 to	 as	 the	 garden	 economy	 (Németh,	 1943).The	
term	of	peasant	embourgoisement	(cf.	Erdei,	1973)	was	created	to	describe	the	




articulated	 for	 a	 land	 reform	 that	 would	 have	 benefited	 a	 free‐holder	
peasantry	in	the	1930s.	After	the	devastation	of	the	war,	the	political	agenda	








the	 social	 transformation	 which	 the	 Moscow‐backed	 communist	 party	 had	
envisioned	 and	 later	 applied	 was	 not	 peasant	 embourgeoisment,	 but	 the	
Stalinist	 model	 of	 industrialization,	 for	 which	 they	 needed	 a	 completely	
different	approach	to	agriculture.	
Lampland	 emphasizes	 that	 rather	 than	 a	 genuinely	 ‘Socialist’	 turn,	
Stalinist	collectivization	featured	a	strong	continuity	with	previous	structures	
of	 estates	 and	 agrarian	 labour.	 Indeed,	 the	 structural	 push	 for	 large‐scale,	
increasingly	 technological	agriculture	remained	 in	place,	while	 the	 increased	
productivity	of	agriculture	was	used	for	a	next	phase	of	structural	integration	
in	the	world	capitalist	economy:	the	effort	to	catch	up	with	the	industrialization	of	
core	 countries.	 The	 ‘free’	 agricultural	work	 of	 interwar	 estates,	 in	 fact	 coupled	
with	 repressive	 forms	 of	 labour	 control,	 including	 slavery,	 coerced	 cash‐crop	
labour	or	semi‐wage	forms	depending	on	patronal	ties,	found	its	continuation	in	a	
proletarianization	 process	 which,	 however	 forceful,	 did	 not	 manage	 to	 fully	
penetrate	the	wage	form	into	the	peasant	class,	and	coupled	brutal	exploitation	of	
the	agrarian	sector	for	the	sake	of	industry	with	pushing	individual	producers	
to	 complement	 their	 livelihood	 with	 farming	 small	 plots.	 This	 semi‐proletarian	
type	of	agrarian	labour	has	been	described	as	a	lasting	characteristic	of	semi‐
peripheries	 across	 cycles	 of	 world‐economic	 integration	 (Dunaway,	 2012).	
That	debates	over	the	measurement	of	labour	value	or	assessing	conditions	of	
migrant	 workers	 were	 similar	 in	 geographically	 distant	 locations,	 as	 Lampland	
notes	 e.g.	 between	 Hungary	 and	Mexico	 (Lampland,	 2016:94),	 follows	 from	
typical	tensions	of	the	integration	process	 in	similar	world‐market	positions.	
The	continuity	of	 that	process	 implies	a	 localized	 story	of	uneven	 development,	
bridging	 early	 forms	 of	 the	 second	 serfdom	 in	 the	 16th	 century,	 manorial	
serfdom	 in	 late	 19th	 century,	 and	 the	 forceful	 exploitation	 of	 peasants	 by	 state‐
socialist	cooperatives	in	the	middle	of	the	20th	century.	From	a	world‐economic	
point	 of	 view,	 the	 continuous	 sweep	 of	modernization	 Lampland	 points	 out	
coalesced	with	global	trends,	as	former	agrarian	social	structures	were	replaced	
by	 industrialization,	 urbanization	 and	 proletarianization	 –	 although	 amongst	
different	 institutional	 settings.	 The	 transformation	 Lampland	 follows	 in	 the	
commodification	of	agricultural	labour	in	the	1930s	and	1940‐50s	in	Hungary	






















associate	 technopolitical	 structures	with	a	responsibility	over	distortions	of	 the	
local	modernization	process.	For	example,	 following	 the	narratives	of	a	 specific	
strain	of	literature	on	historical	context	(Berend	and	Ránki,1958;	Borhi,	2004;	Pető	
and	Szakács,1985;	Valuch,	1996,	etc.),	she	portrays	the	history	of	Stalinist	economic	
policies	 as	 a	 struggle	 between	 rational	 expertise	 and	 ideological	 industrialist	
politics,	like	in	the	case	of	István	Friss	and	the	Institute	of	Economics	(KTI)	under	












technology	 with	 immediate	 export	 possibilities	 to	 pay	 for	 technology	 imports	
(often	provided	by	agriculture).	The	alternation	between	the	two	strategies,	coupled	
with	position	 struggles	within	 the	 apparatus,	 is	 a	 long‐standing	 characteristic	 of	
such	efforts,	as	is	the	problem	of	external	debt	following	from	the	failure	to	solve	
the	 contradiction	 between	 technology	 imports	 and	 export	 pressure.	 From	 this	
perspective,	 it	 is	 not	 specific	 policy	 schemes	 or	 technopolitical	 agents	who	 are	
responsible	 for	 the	 ‘distortions’	 of	 the	 modernization	 process,	 but	 the	 uneven	










created	 and	 propagated	 before	 1945	 was	 finally	 implemented	 within	 the	
structures	of	the	party	state	also	opens	the	question	of	the	position	of	experts	
within	 the	material	 process	 of	world	 economic	 integration.	 The	 story	 of	 the	
materialization	 of	 1930s	 agricultural	 expert	 knowledge,	 and	 its	 intriguing	
transgression	of	the	temporal	and	political	borders	of	a	Cold	War	framework,	
is	 coupled	 with	 a	 story	 of	 a	 professional	 class	 struggling	 for	 a	 new	 expert	
infrastructure,	 and	 later	 occupying	 positions	 within	 it.	 In	 the	 1930s	 experts	
propagated	 modernization	 measures	 based	 on	 Western	 models	 in	 a	 situation	
where	this	knowledge	was	not	yet	required	either	by	 landlords	or	by	the	state.	
This	 might	 create	 the	 impression	 that	 ideas	 for	 agricultural	 modernization	






stepping	 up	 as	 propagators	 and	 initiators	 of	 modernization	 projects	 has	 been	
linked	 to	 the	 limits	 of	middle	 class	 development	 in	 a	 semi‐peripheral	 position,	
where	ambitions	for	middle	class	life	standards	on	par	with	Western	models	are	
recurrently	 channelled	 towards	 political	 projects	 and	 state	 positions	 (Janos,	
2000).	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	 ’cyclical	movement	 of	 intellectuals	 in	 Eastern	 Europe’	
across	positions	like	the	Bildungsbürgertum	of	the	19th	century,	vanguards	of	the	






















beyond	Cold	War	 frameworks.	 In	 this	approach,	 it	 is	historical	contingencies	
of	 institutional	 constructs	 that	 create	multiplicities	 in	 the	 global	modernization	
process.	Viewed	as	part	of	global	integration,	local	institutional	processes	appear	
as	contingent	not	only	upon	their	own	histories	but	also	on	conditions	set	by	the	
interrelated	 and	 uneven	 process	 of	 global	 modernization.	 In	 the	 latter	 sense,	
deficiencies	and	contradictions	of	semi‐peripheral	modernization,	debates	on	
the	role	of	large	estates,	the	obligations	of	the	peasantry,	or	the	monetization	
of	 agricultural	 labour	 are	 not	 only	 locally	 conflictual	 practices	 or	 competing	
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